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In fact, Solow’s observation applies equally well to
other advanced economies as it does to the U.S. A
slowdown in productivity growth has been the
plight of other developed countries as well. The bot-
tom half of Figure 1 displays the annual growth of
labor productivity (output per worker) for the G-5
countries, the five largest economies in the world.2
The overall trends for the five countries are similar,
and in all cases labor productivity growth has slowed
down to 1–2% in the 1990s, from somewhat higher
levels in earlier time periods. This slowdown has
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The productivity paradox of information technology questions
the contributions of IT to economic output and productivity,
based on the fact that there has been a marked slowdown in pro-
ductivity growth despite massive and growing investments in IT. Figure 1 (top half) illustrates
the paradox for the U.S., graphing the annual growth of labor productivity and new IT invest-
ment per worker over the period 1965–1994.1 It is apparent that annual growth rate in labor
productivity has slowed from over 3% in the 1960s to roughly 1% in the 1990s. By compari-
son, IT investments have been growing at much higher rates for most of this time period. These
and other similar trends in the U.S. economy are concisely expressed by Robert Solow’s now-
famous quip that “the computer age is everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”
Sanjeev Dewan and 
Kenneth L. Kraemer
1Labor productivity is measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in terms of real out-
put (gross domestic product—GDP) per worker, while IT is measured by Bureau of
Economic Affairs asset category Office, Computing and Accounting Machinery
(OCAM). This category was dominated by office equipment such as typewriters and
photocopiers in the 1960s, but over time OCAM has become increasingly representa-
tive of computers and peripheral equipment. To smooth the series and clarify the
underlying trends, we display 5-year moving averages for both variables. 
2We focus on labor productivity, rather than the more appropriate multifactor pro-
ductivity measure, because the latter is difficult to obtain for countries other than the
U.S. In any case, both productivity measures tend to move together.
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Don’t blame IT! 
occurred concurrently with rela-
tively much faster growth rates
of IT capital per worker. Figure
2 depicts the cumulative average
growth rates in IT capital stock
per worker and in output per
worker. In all cases, the growth
rate of IT capital per worker
dwarfs the growth rate of labor
productivity. Indeed, all five
countries look very similar in
this regard. 
Despite the fact the produc-
tivity paradox of IT is an inter-
national phenomenon, virtually
all of the considerable debate on
the subject has been restricted to
the U.S. (see [1–3, 5, 8–10]).
The purpose of this article is to
go beyond the U.S. and examine
the experience of other devel-
oped countries with respect to
returns on IT investments. The
hope is that by pooling the expe-
riences of several similar coun-
tries, we can provide new
insights into the payoffs from IT
investment (or lack thereof) for
each individual country. Before
doing so, however, we briefly
review the productivity paradox
debate in the U.S. context. Cen-
tral discussions on the paradox,
and IT business value in general,
have occurred in the Workshop
on Information Systems and
Economics (WISE) over the
years. For example, the 1997
Workshop opened with a coun-
try-level analysis, followed by
several firm-level analyses and a
panel discussion.3  
The Dialog in the U.S. Context
As suggested by Brynjolfsson and Hitt in this sec-
tion, the U.S. experience with IT value to date can
be characterized by two main periods: the produc-
tivity paradox period and the IT payoff period. In
both these periods, the U.S. economy has seen an
explosion in deployed computing power, driven by
the continuous and dramatic price/performance
improvements of IT—the quality-adjusted price of
computing has declined at the average annual rate
of 20% over the last three decades. The productiv-
ity paradox debate was born when the high expec-
tations from rapid computerization failed to be
reflected in the productivity statistics, and analysts
such as Steven Roach and Paul Strassman took up
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Figure 1. Illustrating the productivity paradox
3See the WISE ‘97 Web site: webfoot.csom.umn.edu/faculty/kauffman/wise97/
wise97prog.htm 
the issue in the media. Scholars addressed the issue
too, but academic studies based on aggregate U.S.
data from the 1970s and 1980s failed to find evi-
dence that IT made a measurable positive contri-
bution to output. Beginning in the early 1990s,
the pattern of research evidence shifted. 
Several firm-level studies, based on production
function analysis, have documented substantial pos-
itive returns from IT investment. Starting with
Brynjolfsson and Hitt, analyses of different samples
of Fortune 1,000 companies have estimated average
gross returns on IT investments ranging from 50%
to over 100%, depending on the specific model and
data (see [2, 3, 5]). There is further evidence of
excess returns on IT investment relative to labor
and some evidence of excess returns to non-IT cap-
ital [3, 5]. In other words, shifting dollars at the
margin from labor and non-IT capital inputs into
IT would have led to a higher average output of
U.S. firms, over the period of analysis. Finally, IT
capital is a net substitute for non-IT capital and
labor, suggesting that the factor share of IT in pro-
duction will grow to more substantive levels over
time, as IT displaces non-IT factors of production
[3]. It is worth noting, however, that Sichel’s [9]
analysis, based on a growth accounting framework,
using different assumptions than the above stream
of research, leads to less “bullish” conclusions on
the macroeconomic contributions of IT. Thus, there
is less than complete unanimity in the research
world on this issue. 
Along with research attention, the productivity
paradox continues to receive much coverage in the
popular business press. Stephen
Roach, Chief Economist at Morgan
Stanley, is a leading figure who has
kept the debate in the foreground,
but whose views on the issue have
changed several times. For exam-
ple, Roach launched a crusade in
the late 1980s for IT-led restruc-
turing to boost productivity in the
service sector, which is increasingly
dominating the U.S. economy, but
has lagged behind the manufactur-
ing sector in productivity growth.
Roach has since switched his posi-
tion, as reflected in the following
quote from the New York Times [6]:
“doubts have caused me to rethink
many of the glorious conclusions
that I have long argued would be
part of the sacred productivity-led
recovery.” Roach’s recent doubts
about the role of IT as an engine of
reengineering are based on reports
of negative consequences accompa-
nying some corporate downsizings.
While Roach’s opinions appear to
be based on simplified analysis and
anecdotal evidence of industry trends, they have
focused attention on the importance of scientific evi-
dence regarding IT and productivity.
Paul Strassman, former CIO of the Xerox Corpo-
ration and the U.S. Department of Defense, has also
kept the debate alive. He is skeptical about the
recent positive findings by academics and prefers his
own line of analysis, summarized in the following
excerpt from Computerworld [10]: “Contrary to
expectations, productivity hasn’t improved during
the past decade. The amount of SG&A (selling, gen-
eral, and administrative expenses) required to man-
age every dollar’s worth of COGS (cost of goods sold)
hasn’t fallen, despite massive IT investments.” In our
view, the trouble with this line of analysis is that it
is based on imprecise (and possibly incorrect) mea-
sures of productivity. COGS and SG&A are both
inputs to production and their ratio does not mea-
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Figure 2. Productivity paradox of IT is an international
phenomenon 
sure productivity, which ought to
be a ratio of output to input. Fur-
ther, IT affects both COGS and
SG&A and therefore there is no
reason to expect a particular trend
in their ratio. The spirit of this
argument is also reflected in
recent organizational research [7]
that examines the effects of corpo-
rate downsizing on the ratio of
administrative staff to total
employees.
While analyses such as those
by Roach and Strassman are less
than rigorous, they highlight dif-
ferent facets of the problem and
the diversity of opinion. They
also suggest, however, that per-
haps additional perspectives and
different types of analyses might
be  required to establish robust-
ness and to make the findings
more widely accepted. The analy-
sis described here is one step in
this direction.
Cross-Country Research
Design
Our research method is based on
pooling aggregate data on output,
IT and non-IT inputs from several
developed countries, to examine if
IT is making a measurable contri-
bution to the economic output of these nations [4].
We are proposing a country-level approach, in con-
trast to the firm-level research cited previously. The
distinctive features of the country-level approach are
as follows:
• It directly addresses the productivity paradox at
the level of analysis at which the research has
shown it to exist—the country level.
• It enables one to assess whether IT is leading to a
“bigger economic pie” or merely redistributing
economic gains among different industry sectors
or firms in the economy.
• It involves pooling data from several similar
countries, so that new insights can be gained
about the IT payoff for each of those countries.
• It broadens the scope of existing firm-level
research, which has focused exclusively on large
U.S. corporations and, therefore, might not be
representative of the experiences of the major
economies in the world.  
The key payoff from adopting this distinctly differ-
ent perspective and level of analysis is that if the
results are broadly consistent with earlier firm-level
findings, then this would boost the confidence that
can be placed in this entire stream of research. 
We estimate returns on IT investments by pool-
ing data from 17 developed countries over the period
1985–1992. Our estimation model, derived  from
the well-known Cobb-Douglas production function,
relates changes in GDP per worker to changes in IT
capital stock per worker and non-IT capital stock per
worker. In the regression model—presented in Table
2—the dependent variable is the change in GDP per
worker over the sample period 1985 to 1992, and the
explanatory variables are: the change in IT capital
stock per worker, the change in non-IT capital stock
per worker, and the change in the number of work-
ers itself, over the same time period. We use ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression to obtain estimates of
the three production function parameters a1, a2, and
a3. The values of the key parameters a1 and a2 are
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GDP ($Bn)
IT Stock/GDP
Non-IT Stock/GDP
Number of Workers (Millions)
GDP per Worker ($)
IT Capital per Worker ($)
Non-IT Capital per Worker ($)
*The countries in the data set: United States, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden,
Australia, Germany, Japan, Finland, Denmark, France, Belgium, United Kingdom, Netherlands,
Austria, Italy, and New Zealand.
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0.015
1.53
18.8
33,704
526
50,130
1,138
0.008
0.68
27.0
4,425
368
19,770
792
0.110
1.58
20.1
36,864
4,027
57,262
1,332
0.031
0.65
30.4
4,467
1,016
57,262
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
1985 1992Variable
Table 1. Summary statistics of key variables in 1985 and 1992 for 17 developed
countries (dollar figures are in billions of 1990 U.S. dollars)*
Change in IT Capital per Worker (a1)
Change in non-IT Capital per Worker (a2)
Change in the number of Workers (a3)
N
R2 
0.041
0.056
–0.153
3.538
0.686
–0.540
17
0.73
Variable ParameterEstimate T-Statistic
***
*** indicates significance at 1%
The cross-country regression model is as follows:
Log GDP_WKR1992– Log GDP_WKR1985 = a1(Log IT_WKR1992 – Log IT_WKR1985)
    + a2(Log K _WKR1992 – Log K _ WKR1985) + a3(LogWKR1992 – LogWKR1985),
      GDP_WKRt = GDP per Worker in Year t,
      IT_WKRt = IT Capital Stock per Worker in Year t,
      K_WKRt = Non-IT Capital Stock per Worker in Year t, and
      WKRt  = Number of Workers (total labor force) in Year t.
Table 2. Estimates from the cross-country production 
function model
interpreted as the percentage change in GDP per
worker associated with a 1% change in IT capital per
worker and a 1% change in non-IT capital per
worker, respectively. This particular specification
was chosen for the following reasons:
• It is a simple linear model (in logarithms) that
allows us to focus on the structure of returns on
IT versus non-IT capital investment.
• Analyzing ratios of variables to the number of
workers minimizes the effect of size-related biases
in our econometric estimates (we effectively con-
trol for heteroskedasticity).
• Taking differences allows us to control for fixed
effects that vary with country, such as the struc-
ture of the economy, number of work hours,
weather, infrastructure, and technical efficiencies.
• We analyze differences between the start and end
of the sample period (1985–1992) to allow for
possible adjustment lags in the production system.
Next, we briefly explain the sources of our data
and the construction of our variables. IT invest-
ment data were obtained from International Data
Corporation (IDC), while GDP, non-IT capital
and labor data were obtained from the Penn
World Tables [11], the International Labor Orga-
nization (ILO), the International Monetary Foun-
dation (IMF) and other sources. The construction
of variables is described in detail elsewhere [4]
and we only pro-
vide a brief sum-
mary here. 
The IDC data-
base contains
investment in cur-
rent U.S. dollars in
four distinct IT cat-
egories: Hardware,
Data Communica-
tions, Software, and
Services. These
investment flows
are combined to
calculate the net
stock of IT capital
in constant 1990
U.S. dollars. This
measure of IT capi-
tal stock focuses on
the end use of com-
puters themselves and does not include embedded
microelectronics nor telecommunications. GDP and
non-IT capital stock are obtained from the 1995 ver-
sion of the Penn World Tables. The distinctive fea-
ture of this widely used cross-country database is
that it displays key national variables using currency
conversions based on purchasing power parities,
rather than exchange rates, so that real quantity
comparisons can be made across countries and over
time. Finally, the labor force data (number of work-
ers) is obtained from the ILO Labor Statistics Data-
base and IMF. 
Table 1 provides the list of 17 developed countries
in our data set, along with their summary statistics
in 1985 and 1992. These countries are by and large
the most developed and richest counties in the
world, and all of them are members of the OECD.
All dollar figures cited in the table are in billions of
constant 1990 U.S. dollars. The average economy is
quite large with an average GDP of $792 billion in
1992 and a work force of roughly 20 million work-
ers. GDP per worker, a measure of labor productiv-
ity,  increased 9.4% over the sample period, going
from 33,704 in 1985 to 36,864 in 1992. What
stands out in the table is the increase in IT inputs:
the factor share of IT capital (IT as a percentage of
GDP) increased from 1.5% in 1985 to 11% in 1992.
IT capital per worker went from $526 in 1985 to
$4,027 in 1992, an increase of 666%. By compari-
son, the factor share of non-IT capital, and non-IT
capital per worker, increased by only 3.3% and
14.2%, respectively. These comparative changes in
the deployment of IT and non-IT capital reflect the
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Figure 3. Positive relationship between change in IT capital
per worker and change in GDP per worker 
relative price changes and attempts by countries to
take advantage of the relatively superior  price/per-
formance improvements in IT. 
Returns from IT Investments
We start with a simple graphical illustration of the
relationship between IT and output growth. Figure
3 displays a scatter plot of the “orthogonal compo-
nents” of the change in GDP per worker and the
change in IT per worker (both measured in loga-
rithms), for our set of 17 developed countries. The
orthogonal components are the portions of the
respective variables not explained by the variation in
the control variables, which are the changes in non-
IT capital per worker and in the number of workers.
Technically, the orthogonal components are the
residuals obtained by separately regressing the
change in GDP per worker and change in IT per
worker against the two control variables. The trend
line in Figure 3 slopes upward, implying that an
increase in IT capital per worker is associated with an
increase in GDP per worker, on average. Countries
scattered above (below) the trend line experienced a
higher (lower) than average change in output per
worker, corresponding to the change in the level of
their IT capital per worker. 
To quantify the relationship depicted graphically
in Figure 3, we turn to the estimates from our cross-
country production function model, presented in
Table 2. Of the three model parameters, only a1 is
statistically significant.4 Its value is positive at the
1% significance level and estimated to be 0.041.
This estimate suggests that a 1% increase in IT cap-
ital is associated with a 0.041% increase in output.
The average factor share of IT (IT as a fraction of
GDP) for the 17 countries over the sample period is
0.058. Accordingly, the average gross return implied
by our IT elasticity estimate of a1 is 0.041/0.058 =
70.6%. In other words, an increase in IT capital
stock of $100 million is associated with an average
increase in GDP of $70.6 million. If the return on
investment seems high, note that it is gross of depre-
ciation and interest rates, which can be as high as
25–30% for IT. Further, there is considerable impre-
cision in the statistical estimates of return: the 95%
confidence interval ranges from 30.3% to 111%. 
These estimates can be applied to U.S. data, where
the IT factor share over 1985–1992 averaged about
7%. Accordingly, our estimate of gross return from
IT investment for the U.S. is 0.041/0.07 = 58.6%.
This estimate is well within the range of findings
from U.S. firm-level research. Thus, the country-
level approach we have used leads to results that are
broadly consistent with previous firm-level research
[2, 3, 5], increasing our level of confidence in these
findings. 
To summarize, our analysis suggests that devel-
oped countries are receiving a positive and signifi-
cant return on their IT investments. The returns
from non-IT capital investments, however, are not
statistically significant at the margin. 
Interpreting the New Evidence on
Returns to IT
How can we explain the comparative returns from IT
and non-IT capital investment implied by our find-
ings? A possible explanation is that developed coun-
tries have already built up a mature stock of such
assets as industrial and transportation equipment,
plant, inventory and structures and can therefore
expect only normal or below-normal rates of return
from further investment in non-IT capital. By con-
trast, there is ample room for productive IT invest-
ments to further take advantage of continuing
improvements in IT price/performance. New IT cap-
ital investments appear to be the key for further
improvements in output per worker, especially when
coupled with new and complementary business mod-
els, which together yield higher rates of return. 
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4We do not believe that multicollinearity is the reason for the insignificance of the
non-IT coefficients, for the following reasons: the residual plots did not indicate any
abnormal behavior; perturbations to the data set, by excluding or including some coun-
tries, did not result in material changes to the estimates; none of the simple correlations
among the explanatory variables are statistically significant.
IT investments are contributing to output and productivity at 
a rate that is disproportionate to their factor share in production. 
One example of such new business models is
offered by Dell Computer. Dell’s business model,
which involves direct sales and build-to-order pro-
duction for specific customer segments, has been so
successful that in the 1990s, it is now being adopted
by every major PC company in the industry. Dell
uses IT to support its business model and to coordi-
nate with suppliers and customers through real-time
sharing of information, thereby achieving efficiency
and virtual integration throughout its value chain.
Dell’s revenues have grown at an average annual rate
of 55% over the last five years, even though its ratio
of administrative staff to total employees has
remained unchanged, and its stock price growth has
outpaced all firms in the industry by an order of
magnitude. 
Another example of a new business model (at the
country level) is offered by the city-state of Singa-
pore. Since 1980, Singapore has promoted itself as a
business hub for multinational corporations and sys-
tematically invested in IT use by business and gov-
ernment. It has also invested heavily in education of
IT professionals, construction of industry IT net-
works and promotion related to IT use. As a conse-
quence, Singapore has become the business hub for
the Asia-Pacific region attracting high value added
production and business services. Wong Poh Kam’s
[12] study of IT investments in Singapore estimated
the return on investment at 88%, which is signifi-
cantly higher than the assumed capital depreciation
plus interest rate of 37%.
How can we explain these high returns from IT
investment in developed countries? A potential
explanation is that the estimated returns from IT
investment reflect other changes in the economies of
developed countries that are complementary to IT
investments, such as infrastructure, human capital,
and informatization of business processes. In other
words, the positive returns are not only due to
increases in IT capital per worker, but also reflect
simultaneous changes in education, infrastructure
and other factors that complement labor and make it
more productive. The developed countries have
learned how to use the technology effectively over
the past 30 years; part of the cost of their IT invest-
ments can usefully be thought of as the tuition paid
for that learning. 
What does all this add up to with respect to the
productivity paradox of IT? Figures 1 and 2, which
illustrate the paradox, suggest that the slowdown in
productivity growth is puzzling given the level and
growth of IT investments. While the slowdown is
potentially explained by several different factors (for
example, the overstatement of inflation), our results
clearly indicate that IT is not to be blamed for the
slowdown. On the contrary, IT investments are con-
tributing to output and productivity at a rate that is
disproportionate to their factor share in production.
For the countries in our sample, IT capital consti-
tutes 1/20 of GDP, but accounts for one-third to
one-half of growth in output (and productivity). As
IT continues to displace labor, factory, and equip-
ment throughout the production system (from sup-
pliers to producers to customers), its share of the
total inputs to the economy will continue to
increase. As this occurs, and IT investments
approach 10–15% of GDP, the economic contribu-
tions of IT will be more visible and the productivity
issue will no longer be a matter of debate.
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